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Abstract— This paper presents a certification model for Non-
repudiation (NR) of cloud storage services. NR, i.e., the possession of 
proofs that certain exchanges have taken place amongst interacting 
parties, is a significant security property for cloud data storage 
services but is less studied than other security properties (e.g., 
integrity, confidentiality). Our model for certifying NR is based on a 
continuous monitoring approach, i.e., a 3
rd
 level certification in the 
reference certification framework of the Cloud Security Alliance. 
Keywords— non-repudiation; cloud; security certification; 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Despite the fast growth of cloud services, security is still a 
main barrier for their adoption. Cloud computing is aimed at 
providing users with efficient and flexible services. At the 
basic cloud infrastructure layer, these services include compute 
and data storage services [4][5]. Both these types of services 
must be secure [4][5][11][13]. Nevertheless, storing data in 
clouds is still a concern from a security point of view, as 
several incidents cast doubt on the level of security offered by 
cloud storage services. Examples of such incidents include the 
corruption of Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) leading to 
stored files no longer matching customers' hashes [6] and an 
access-control bug in Google Docs that allowed unauthorized 
access to documents [14]. Although security properties as 
confidentiality, authentication, access control, and availability 
have been studied thoroughly for clouds, non-repudiation has 
only been recently investigated in this context [9]. 
Non-repudiation (NR) is a property of data storage, 
requiring that when a data owner (consumer) sends a request to 
a cloud provider for uploading (downloading) data, the data 
uploading (downloading) transaction should be conducted in a 
way such that neither the data owner (consumer) nor the cloud 
data storage provider could deny having participated in a part 
or the whole of this transaction. Several protocols have been 
proposed to realise non-repudiation (e.g., 
[4][7][11][12][15][16]).  The basic principle that underpins 
these protocols is that along with a data uploading 
(downloading) request the data owner (consumer) sends a 
“Non-Repudiation of Origin” (NRO) token, i.e., a proof of 
sending the request, and expects to receive evidence of “Non-
Repudiation of Receipt” (NRR) from the cloud provider, 
acknowledging that the specific request was received.  
Whilst these protocols have been proven to provide NR 
under given assumptions their implementation can have bugs 
or suffer from attacks, such as man-in-the-middle, replay or 
timeline attacks [4]. Therefore, certifying the correct 
implementation of protocols and the robustness of their 
implementation to these types of attack is necessary for giving 
cloud customers the assurances required for NR. 
In this paper we present an approach for certifying the 
implementation of a NR protocol mechanism that is based on 
the fair multi-party non-repudiation (MPNR) scheme proposed 
in [4]. Our certification scheme is based on a continuous 
monitoring approach that we introduced in [10], as part of the 
CUMULUS project [3]. More specifically, it is based on 
monitoring the actual operations of cloud services to gather 
evidence enabling a continuous assessment of the satisfaction 
of the security property of interest. Under this approach, a 
certificate for the security property is issued when the 
accumulated evidence is sufficient (e.g., it covers a required 
spectrum of service usage scenarios) and there is no violation 
of the security property within the monitoring period. Hence, 
our approach is compatible with certification of level 3 
maturity in the reference certification maturity model of the 
Cloud Security Alliance [18]. 
The use of a monitoring based certification approach is 
necessary for assessing NR in cloud storage services, as the 
provision of this property depends on the correct realisation of 
an NR protocol not only by the cloud provider but also by the 
data producers/owners and consumers interacting with it. 
However, as the latter two partners are not under the control of 
the cloud provider and may change dynamically, they 
introduce uncertainties that require a dynamic form of NR 
assessment and certification.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sect. II 
overviews related work. Sect. III presents the NR Protocol for 
cloud services assumed by the certification model. Sect. IV 
gives an overview of the specification of certification models. 
Sect. V presents the certification model for NR. Sect. VI gives 
an overview of the CUMULUS framework that is used to 
implement the NR certification model. Finally, Sect. VII 
provides concluding remarks and directions for future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
There are two strands of research related to this paper: (a) 
research on NR protocols and (b) research on certification. 
While non-repudiation can be achieved by standard 
cryptographic mechanisms, one of the key issues in NR 
protocols is that of fair message transfer between the involved 
parties, i.e., ensuring that the communication parties follow the 
rules of the protocol and do not abandon execution 
intentionally. An approach addressing fairness by using an 
inline trusted third party (TTP), i.e., a TTP participating in 
every transmission of the protocol is presented in [2]. 
However, the constant involvement of TTP can lead to 
bottlenecks and reduced availability. Hence, other protocols 
use online TTPs, i.e., where TTPs that do not participate in all 
transmissions [15]. A further improvement is the use of offline 
(aka optimistic) TTPs [1], which are TTPs involved only in 
cases of disputes or network failure. This approach has been 
also adopted in [8][16]. Other work focuses on securing cloud 
storage. Popa et al. [13] presented an NR protocol for cloud 
storage and Feng et al. [5] introduced four variants of NR 
protocols, based on digital signature and authentication code. 
Research on certification has traditionally produced 
methods based on the Common Criteria model [17]. These 
models use Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) to reflect any 
added assurance requirements in order to achieve a CC 
Certification. More recently the Cloud Security Alliance 
(CSA) has proposed the Open Certification Framework (OCF) 
[18]. OCF provides different maturity levels of certification. 
The 3
rd
 maturity level of OCF refers to certification based on 
continuous monitoring, which is compatible with the approach 
we advocate in this paper.  
III. NON- REPUDIATION PROTOCOL FOR CLOUD SERVICES 
Our certification model aims to certify adherence to the 
enhanced NR Protocol for clouds presented in [4]. To enable 
the reader understand this model, in this section, we give an 
overview of the underpinning NR protocol. 
This protocol involves four parties: (i) a data 
owner/provider (“A”), (ii) a data user (“B”), (iii) the Cloud 
Provider (“C”) and (iv) a Trusted Third Party (TTP). These 
parties interact through three phases of the protocol, which are 
shown in Figure 1. These phases are: (1) the data upload 
phase, (2) the data download phase, and (3) a recovery phase.  
Before describing these phases, we provide some basic 
definitions necessary for understanding them: 
• NRO: Evidence of Non-Repudiation of Origin, sent by a 
sender to a receiver. The receiver will hold this evidence as 
proof if the sender denies having sent the message.  
• NRR: evidence of Non-Repudiation of Receipt, sent by the 
receiver to the sender. The sender will hold this evidence as 
a proof if the receiver denies having received the message.  
• fM: Flag indicating the intended purpose of a message M. 
• l: Unique label chosen by A to link all messages. 
• M: Message sent from a sender to a receiver. 
• H(M): Hash function applied to message M. 
• K: Message key defined by the sender. 
• BL: Group of data users Bi who are authorised to download 
message M and are capable of decrypting it.  
• Seqi: Unique sequence number of each message.  
• EGB(): Group encryption scheme known only to BL group.  
• EX(Y): Asymmetric encryption of message Y produced by 
party X’s public key. 
• SX(Y): signature of message Y produced by X’s private key. 
The three phases of the protocol are described below. 
A. Upload Phase 
In this phase the data owner A sends a request to the cloud 
provider C, for uploading data. Firstly, A encrypts a message 
M (i.e., the data) with a key K and generates two different 
NROs: NROAB and NROAC. NROAB will be used by data users 
B to get the key K required to decrypt M and SA(H(M)) to 
verify the data integrity after downloading M from C. A 
encrypts NROAB   using the group encryption scheme EGB() to 
guarantee that only the intended recipients of the BL can have 
access and decipher NROAB and M. NROAC is the proof of 
evidence that A sent the request to C and is encrypted with C’s 
public key. This step is defined as: 
 
Figure 1.  Non-Repudiation Protocol for Clouds 
AC: RQSAC = {fRQS
AC
, l, A, C, TTP, H(M), H(BL), Seq1, Tg1, 
T1, EGB(NROAB), EC(NROAC)} 
Where: 
• T1 is the maximum time that the sender will wait for an 
NRR to RQSAC. 
• Tg1 is the time of the generation of RQSAC. 
• NROAB is an NRO sent from A to B users through C. It is 
visible to all BL recipients, but not to C itself.  
NROAB = {K, l, SA(H(M))} 
• NROAC is an NRO sent from A to C, defined as 
NROAC={SA(H(M),H(BL),EGB(NROAB),H(l,Seq1,Tg1, T1))}. 
When C receives a RQSAC it must produce a response to A. 
This step is defined as: 
CA: RSPCA = {fRSP
CA
, l, A, C, TTP, H(M), H(BL), Seq2, Tg2, 
TS, EA(NRRCA)} 
Where: 
• TS is time when data is stored 
• Tg2 is the time of the generation of RSPAC. 
• NRRCA is the NRR sent from C to A, defined as 
NRRCA = {SC(H(M)), SC(H(l, Seq2, Tg2, TS, NROAC))}. 
B. Download Phase 
In this phase, the data user B downloads data from the 
cloud provider C. To do so, B sends a request with an NROBC 
to C. The request should include B’s identity to enable C verify 
whether the B is authorised to download the requested data. 
This is done by checking B’s identity against the BL received 
for M from the data owner A. If B is in BL, C will send the 
requested data along with the encrypted NROAB 
(EGB(NROAB)) received from A and  its own non-repudiation 
evidence NRRCB. These exchanges are defined below: 
BiC: RQSBiC = {fRQS
BiC
, li, A, C, Bi, TTP, Seq3, Tg3, T2, 
EC(NROBC)} 
Where: 
• li= H(A, C, Bi, TTP) 
• NROBC is the NRO sent from B to C, defined as 
NROBC = {SB(H(li, A, C, TTP, Seq3, Tg3, T2))}.  
 
CBi: RSPCBi = {fRSP
CBi
, l, A, C, Bi, TTP, H(M), Seq4, Tg4, 
EGB(NROAB), �!!(NRRCB)} 
Where: 
• NRRCB is the  NRR sent from C to B, defined as 
 NRRCA={SC(H(M)),SC(EGB(NROAB)),SC(H(l,Seq4,Tg4))}. 
When B gets the data and the EGB from C, it will obtain K 
and H(Data) by decrypting the NROAB and check the integrity 
of the data and the validity of NRRCB.  
C. Resolution of Disputation 
If A does not receive the expected response from the C, it 
sends a request to TTP with its identification and the NROAC. 
TTP will subsequently send this request to C and C should 
respond with a corresponding NRRCA. The latter exchanges are 
defined as: 
TTPC: RQSTC = {fRQS
TC
, l, A, C, TTP, Seq5, Tg5, T3, 
EC(NROAC), EC(NROTC)} 
CTTP: RSPCT = {fRSP
CT
, l, A, C, TTP, Seq6, Tg6, TS, 
EA(NRRCA), ET (NRRCT)} 
Where: 
• T3 is the maximum time that the sender will wait for an 
NRR to RQSTC. 
• Tg5 (Tg6) is the time of the generation of RQSTC (RSPCT). 
• TS is the time when data was stored by C. 
• NROTC is the NRO sent from TTP to C to resolve a 
disputation regarding an uploading session of A, defined as 
NROTC={ST (H(l, A, C, TTP, Seq5, Tg5, T5, EC(NROAC)))}. 
• NRRCT is sent from C to TTP, defined as  
NRRCT ={SC(H(l, Seq5, Tg5, NRRCA))}.  
IV. CERTIFICATION MODEL FOR NON-REPUDIATION  
In CUMULUS, certificates may be generated on the basis 
of evidence gathered through continuous monitoring from the 
cloud provider. The cloud provider (i.e., the target of 
certification) and the security property to be certified, the 
extent of the monitoring evidence to be collected, and the 
process of certification are specified according to a monitoring 
based certification model (MBCM). This model drives the 
operation of the CUMULUS framework, which produces 
certificates that can are signed off by a certification authority 
that accepts MBCM either automatically or following some 
audit. In the following we present an MBCM for the NR 
property following an overview of the schema for specifying 
such models that is used by CUMULUS. 
A. Monitoring based certification models: Background 
A monitoring based certification model is specified in an 
XML based language whose top-level structure is shown in 
Figure 2. According to this schema, an MBCM specifies: (1) 
the cloud service to be certified (i.e., a Target of Certification 
(ToC)); (2) the security property to be certified for ToC; (3) the 
certification authority who will sign the certificates generated 
by the model; (4) an assessment scheme defining general 
conditions regarding the evidence that must be collected for 
being able to issue a certificate; (5) further validity tests 
regarding the configuration of the cloud provider and the 
CUMULUS framework itself that must be satisfied prior to 
issuing certificates; (6) the monitoring configurations that will 
be used in order to collect the evidence required for generating 
certificates; (7) the way in which the collected evidence will be 
aggregated in certificates (evidence aggregation); and (8) a life 
cycle model that defines the overall process of issuing 
certificates.  
 
Figure 2.  Monitoring Based Certification Model (MBCM) schema 
In MBCMs, a ToC is specified as a concrete endpoint with a 
set of service interfaces that are offered by it to external parties 
(provided interfaces) and a set of interfaces required of 
external parties (required interfaces). The security property to 
be certified is specified by assertions expressed in EC-
Assertion, i.e., an XML language based on Event Calculus[18]. 
The assessment scheme defines conditions regarding the 
evidence that must be collected in order to be able to issue a 
certificate. These conditions are related to (i) the sufficiency of 
the collected evidence, (ii) the expiration period for 
certificates, and (iii) anomalies and conflicts that should be 
monitored during the certification process. The evidence 
sufficiency conditions may relate to the minimum required 
period of time that the ToC should be monitored and the 
minimum number and representativeness of events (i.e., 
instances of ToC operations) that should be gathered before a 
certificate can be issued. 
In an MBCM, anomalies refer to: (1) potential attacks on 
TOC, (2) other suspicious behaviour or (3) operational 
conditions related to the security property that is to be certified, 
which despite not having caused any violation of it, they may 
potentially affect its satisfiability and, therefore, lead to the 
suspension or revocation of certificate generated by the model. 
The definition of the potential “anomalies” that should be 
monitored as part of a certification model should be based on 
an analysis of whether potential attacks, the ways in which the 
behaviour of different external actors that interact with TOC, 
and the overall operating conditions of the interaction between 
TOC and these actors may affect the satisfaction of the given 
security property by the TOC. Like security properties, 
anomalies are also specified as EC-Assertions, except that their 
violation does not lead automatically to the 
suspension/revocation of a certificate. 
Conflicts aim to capture cases where a given security 
property would not be satisfied if it were to be assessed over 
different monitoring aggregation periods. The availability of a 
service may, for instance, be above 99% if assessed on a 
monthly basis by certification model whose security property 
refers to this period of assessment but be below this threshold 
if shorter/longer assessment intervals are considered. In an 
MBCM conflicts are defined by alternative assessment periods 
for the security property.  
A life cycle model defines the process by which certificates 
of a given MBCM can be generated and managed (e.g., 
suspended, revoked). In an MBCM, a life cycle model (LCM) 
is defined by a state transition model expressed in XML, as 
shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  Life cycle models 
In particular, a life cycle model is defined by a set of states 
and transitions between them. States can be composite or 
atomic. Composite states are refined into parallel or mutally 
exclusive substates. All state types can be associated with 
actions that are executed upon entry to or exit from the state, 
Transitions are associated by call events or triggering 
conditions (when-conditions). They can also be guarded by 
further conditions and be associated with actions that are 
executed when a transition is to be traversed and prior to 
arriving at the destination state. Actions correspond to 
invocations of operations in required and provided interfaces 
that are defined as part of an LTM. Provided interfaces include 
operations offered from the CUMULUS framework and 
required interfaces define operations of external tools. 
Further details regarding the specification of MBCMs are 
available from [20]. 
V. CERTIFICATION MODEL FOR NR 
A. Security property assertions for NR Protocol 
In order to certify a cloud provider C for NR, we should 
monitor the responses (NRR) that C makes to NROs received 
from A, B and TTP during the different phases of the NR 
protocol shown in Figure 1. In particular, it is necessary to 
gather evidence demonstrating that, for every NRO that C 
receives from an NR party, C produces an NRR to it in a 
timely manner (i.e., without a delay that would make the 
relevant external party to be timed out). 
In the case of NROs sent during the upload phase of the 
protocol, the assertion in the NR MBCM contains the 
monitoring rule R1 and the monitoring assumptions R1.A1-
R1.A4 listed below (for readability purposes we specify all 
assertions in the high level syntax of EC-Assertion rather than 
its XML counterpart. A detailed account of EC-Assertion is 
given in [18]): 
SECURITY PROPERTY MONITORING RULE: 
R1: Happens(e(_id1,_A,_C, RQSAC,_C),_tAReq,[_tAReq, _tAReq]) ∧ 
¬ HoldsAt(ResUpReq(RQSAC,_X,_t), _tAReq)⇒ 
Happens(e(_id2,_C,_A,RSPCA,_C),_tg2,[_tAReq,_tAReq+f(_t1)])  
WHERE:  
RQSAC = {_fRQS
AC
, _l, _A, _C, _TTP, _H(M), _H(BL), _Seq1, 
_tg1, _t1, _EGB(K, l, SA(H(M))), _EC(SA(H(M), H(BL), 
_EGB(K, l, SA(H(M))), H(l, Seq1, tg1,t1)))}  
RSPCA = {_fRSP
CA
, _l, _A, _C, _TTP, _H(M), _H(BL), _Seq2, 
_tg2, _ts, _EA(SC(H(M)), SC(H(l, Seq2, tg2, tS, (SA(H(M), 
H(BL),_EGB(K, l, SA(H(M))), H(l, Seq1, tg1, t1))))))} 
SECURITY PROPERTY ASSUMPTIONS: 
R1.A1: Initially(UplReq(_C, 0, systime())) 
R1.A2: Happens(e(_id1,_A,_C,RQSAC,_C),_tAReq,[_tAReq,_tAReq]) 
∧ ¬ HoldsAt(ResUplReq(RQSAC,_X, _t), _tAReq) ∧ 
Happens(e(_id2, _C, _A, RSPCA, _C),_tg2, [_tAReq, _tAReq + 
f(_t1)])∧ HoldsAt(UplReq(_C, _UPN, _ST), _tAReq)) ⇒ 
Terminates(e(_id1, _A, _C, RQSAC, _C), UplReq(_C, _UPN, 
_ST), _tAReq) ∧ Initiates(e(_id1, _A, _C, RQSAC, _C), 
UplReq(_C, _UPN+1, _tg2), _tg2) ∧ 
Initiates(e(_id1, _A, _C, RQSAC, _C), 
     ResUplReq(RQSAC, RSPCA, _tg2), _tg2)  
R1.A3:  Happens(e(_id1,_A,_C,RQSAC,_C),_tAReq,[_tAReq,  _tAReq]) 
∧¬ HoldsAt(ResUplReq(RQSAC,_X, _t), _tAReq) ∧ 
¬ Happens(e(_id2, _C, _A, RSPCA, _C), _tg2, [_tAReq, _tAReq 
+ f(_t1)]) ⇒ Initiates(e(_id1, _A, _C, RQSAC, _C), 
  NoResUplReq(RQSAC, _tAReq), _tAReq + f(_t1)) 
R1.A4:  Happens(e(_id1,_A,_C,RQSAC,_C),_tAReq,[_tAReq,_tAReq]) 
∧¬ HoldsAt(ResUplReq(RQSAC,_X, _t), _tAReq) ∧ 
Happens(e(_id2,  _C,  _A,  RSPCA,  _C),  _tg2,  [_tg2,_tg2])  ∧ 
_tg2  >  _tg1  +  f(_t1) ⇒  Initiates(e(_id2,  _C,  _A,  RQSAC, 
C), LateUplReq(RQSAC, RSPCA, _tg2), _tg2) 
Rule R1 checks if for every request (RQSAC) made by a 
data owner (_A) for uploading data to a cloud provider (_C) at 
some time _tAReq (i.e., the time that the request was received by 
_C) and for which there is no previous request with the same 
sequence number received by _C from _A, _C sends a 
response to _A acknowledging the request (RSPCA) within at 
most f(_t1) time units after _tAReq, where _t1 is the time that the 
data owner will wait for the response. f(_t1) is a function that is 
provided by _C and should satisfy the constraint f(_t1) < _t1 in 
order to minimise the likelihood of _A be timed out due to a 
delayed response from _C.  
The certification model keeps also a record of: 
(a) Requests (RQSAC) for which a matching response (RSPCA) 
was produced within the required time period and when 
no other previous request was made with the same 
sequence number, 
(b) Requests for which no matching response was produced 
within the required time period, 
(c) Requests that had the same sequence number with 
requests responded previously, and 
(d) The total number of responded and non-responded 
requests made from A to C for uploading data. 
To keep these records it uses the monitoring assumptions 
R1.A1–R1.A4. R1.A1 is used to initiate the fluent UplReq(_C, 
_UPN, _ST), which keeps the total number of the responded 
requests between _A and _C (i.e., the value of the variable 
_UPN and systime() is a standard system call that is executed 
by the monitor to obtain the current time of the system where 
the monitoring service is running. R1.A2 updates the fluent 
UplReq(_C, _UPN, _ST) in order to increase the number of the 
successfully responded request for uploading data made from 
A to C (_UPN+1). It also initiates the fluent 
ResUplReq(RQSAC, RSPCA, _tg2), in order to record details of 
the data upload request that was responded in time. The third 
assumption (R1.A3) keeps a record of data upload requests that 
were not responded in time, using the fluent 
NoResUplReq(RQSAC, _tAReq). These correspond to violations 
of the monitoring rule R1.  R1.A4 monitors and keeps a record 
of data upload requests that were responded but not within the 
required time limit. The assumption initiates the fluent 
LateUplReq(RQSAC, RSPCA, _tg2) to keep record of the 
requests responded with delay.  
The records of responded, non-responded and not in time 
responded requests are used as detailed evidence by the 
certification framework, in order to be able to demonstrate the 
correctness of the protocol implementation by a cloud provider 
to relevant stakeholders and inform further analysis related to 
anomalies that may be detected (see Sect. V.B). These 
stakeholders could be: (a) a cloud provider who might have 
failed to obtain a certificate or a cloud provider who has 
obtained a certificate and wishes to provide detailed evidence 
about it, (b) a data producer who wishes to choose a cloud 
provider that is certified for the NR security property by 
checking the evidence, or (c) an auditor who can use these 
evidence for auditing purposes of a cloud provider. 
Keeping these records is necessary as the information 
recorded can be used as evidence in the recovery phase, when 
a TTP sends a request to C for resolving a disputation between 
C and A. More specifically, if C receives a request from a TTP 
regarding a previous request RQSAC from A to C, having this 
information the framework will be able to check whether a late 
response RSPCA from C to A lead to the resolution phase. 
The certification model for NR includes monitors also the 
responses that C provides to data download requests received 
from data users B. The monitoring rules and assumptions for 
this are similar to R1 and R1.A1-R1.A4, expect that that the 
monitor RQSBC requests and RSPCB responses. 
The NR certification model monitors also the behaviour of 
C in response to requests by the trusted third party (TTP), in 
order to resolve disputations that might occur between C and A 
or B. For this purpose, it uses the following EC-Assertion 
formulae:  
SECURITY PROPERTY MONITORING RULE 
R2:  Happens(e(_id1,_TTP,_C,RQSTC,_C),_tTReq,[_tTReq,_tTReq]) 
∧ ¬ HoldsAt(ResTReq(RQSTC, _X, _tg6), _tTReq) ⇒ 
Happens(e(_id2,_C,_TTP,RSPCT,_C),_tTRes,[_tTReq,_tTReq+f(_t3)] 
WHERE:  
RQSTC  =  {_fRQS
TC
,  _l,  _A,  _C,  _TTP,  _Seq5,  _tg5,  _t3, 
_EC(SA(H(M),H(BL),_EGB(K,l,SA(H(M))),H(l,Seq1,tg1,t1))),EC(
ST(H(l,A,C,TTP,Seq5,tg5,t5,EC(ST(H(M),H(BL),_EGB(K,l,SA(H(M
))),H(l,Seq1,tg1,t1))))))} 
RSPCT  =  {_fRSP
CT
,  _l,  _A,  _C,  _TTP,  _Seq6,  _tg6,  _tS, 
_EA(SC(H(M)),SC(H(l,  Seq2,  tg2,  tS,  (SA(H(M),H(BL),_EGB 
(K,l,SA(H(M))),H(l,Seq1,tg1,  t1)))))),  _ET(SC(H(l, 
Seq5,tg5,  (SC(H(M)),SC(H(l,  Seq2,  Tg2,  TS,  (SA(H(M), 
H(BL),_EGB(K, l, SA(H(M))),H(l,Seq1,Tg1, T1)))))))))} 
SECURITY PROPERTY ASSUMPTIONS  
R2.A1:Initially(RecReq(_C, 0, systime())) 
R2.A2: Happens(e(_id5, _TTP, _C, RQSTC, 
_C),_tTTPReq,[_tTTPReq, _tTTPReq]) ∧ ¬ 
HoldsAt(ResRecReq(RQSTC,_X, _t),_tTReq) ∧ 
Happens(e(_id1,_A,_C, RQSAC, _C), _tAReq, [0,_tTTPReq]) ∧ 
Happens(e(_id6, _C, _TTP, RSPCT, _C), _tg6, [_tTReq, _tTReq + 
f(_t3)]) ∧  ∃ _RPN: HoldsAt(RecReq (_C, _RPN, _ST), 
_tTTPReq)) ⇒ Terminates(e(_id5, _TTP, _C, RQSTC, _C), 
RecReq (_C, _ RPN, _ST), _tTTPReq) ∧ Initiates(e(_id5, 
_TTP, _C, RQSTC, _C), RecReq (_C, _ RPN+1, _ST), _tTTPReq) 
∧ Initiates(e(_id5, _TTP, _C, RQSTC, _C), 
ResRecReq(RQSTC,_X, _t), _tTTPReq) 
R2.A3: Happens(e(_id5, _TTP, _C, RQSTC, _C), _tTTPReq, 
[_tTTPReq, _tTTPReq]) ∧ 
¬ HoldsAt(ResRecReq RQSTC,_X, _t),_tTTPReq) ∧ 
Happens(e(_id1, _A, _C, RQSAC, _C),_tAReq,[0,_tTTPReq]) ∧ 
¬ Happens(e(_id6, _C, _TTP, RSPCT, _C), _tg6, [_tTTPReq, 
_tTTPReq + f(_t3)]) ⇒ Initiates(e(_id5, _TTP, _C, RQSTC, 
_C), NoResReq(RQSTC, _tTTPReq), _tTTPReq + f(_t3)) 
R2.A4: Happens(e(_id5, _TTP, _C, RQSTC, _C), 
_tTTPReq,[_tTTPReq,_tTTPReq]) ∧ 
¬HoldsAt(ResRecReq RQSTC,_X, _t), _tTTPReq) ∧ 
Happens(e(_id6, _C, _TTP,RSPCT,_C),_tg6,[_tg6,_tg6]) ∧ 
_ tg6> _tg5 + _f(t3) ⇒ Initiates(e(_id5, _TTP, _C, RQSTC, 
_C), LateRecReq RQSTC, RSPCT, _tg6), _tg6) 
 
R2 checks if every request RQSTC made from a TTP to a 
cloud provider (_C) for resolving a disputation between A and 
C, at some time (_tTReq), for which there was no previous 
request from the same TTP that has already been responded, 
there is a response RSPCT from C to the TTP that matches with 
RQSTC within at most f(_t3) time units where f(_t3)  < _t3 (_t3 is 
the time that TTP will wait for a response). 
As in the case of the interactions with the data owner, the 
certification model uses the following assumptions to keep 
record of (a) every request (RQSTC) for which a matching 
response (RSPCT) was produced within the required time 
period, (b) every request RQSTTPC for which no matching 
response RSPCTTP was produced within the required time 
period, (c) every request made with a same sequence number 
of a previous responded request, and (d) the total number of 
responded and non responded requests made from TTP to C 
for resolving a disputation between the other parties. To keep 
this record it uses the following monitoring assumptions:  
B. Anomaly Detection 
In the following we present anomalies of three different 
types introduced in Sect. IV.A for the NR certification model. 
1) Potential attacks 
In the case of NR, As and Bs may be non trusted parties. 
Both of them, for instance, may try to launch a denial-of-
service attack on C.  This may happen directly by, for example, 
issuing a high volume of data uploading and downloading 
requests to C and/or re-issuing previous requests (replay 
attack). It should be noted that the monitoring rule R1 in the 
certification model would require C to respond only to a 
request from a data provider only if this request has not been 
responded before. Hence, the certification model assumes that 
C should not respond to repeated requests. However, even if no 
response of C is expected in such cases, high volume of 
repetaed requests may escalate to a DOS attack that will 
prevent C from satisfy the NR property.  
Hence the purpose of anomaly monitoring is not to detect the 
individual instances of repeated requests from A to C but to 
detect whether this unexpected activity appears in high 
volume. To monitor and keep a record of the repeated requests 
from particular data owners, the NR certification model should 
include the following anomaly detection monitoring 
assumptions: 
ANOMALY ASSUMPTIONS  
A.A1: Initially(RepeatedUplReq(_A, systime())) 
A.A2: Happens(e(_id1,_A,_C,RQSAC,_C), _tAReq,[ _tAReq, 
_tAReq]) ∧ HoldsAt(ResUpReq(RQSAC,_X,_t), _tAReq)⇒ 
Terminates(e(_id1, _A, _C, RQSAC, _C), 
RepeatedUplReq(_A, _N), _tx) ∧ 
Initiates(e(_id1, _A, _C, RQSAC, _C), 
 RepeatedUplReq(_A, _N + 1), _tx) 
The first of these assumptions initialises the counter of 
repeated requests from a given data owner _A to 0 and the 
second increases it whenever a new previously responded 
requests is re-played by _A.  
Further to these anomaly-monitoring assumptions, the NR 
certification model can include a warning to the certification 
authority regarding the potential compromise of NR as soon as 
the number of repeated data upload requests exceeds a given 
threshold (i.e., N repeated data upload requests per minute). 
This is specified in the life cycle model of the NR certification 
model, as indicated in Figure 4 below.  
To cover the potential of a similar type of attack from data 
users (B), the NR certification model includes also anomaly-
monitoring assumptions similar to those listed above for data 
downloading requests RQSBC.   
2) Suspicious behaviour 
An example of suspicious behaviour that the NR certification 
model should monitor is the receipt of requests for recovery 
from TTP corresponding to requests for data uploading 
(downloading) from A (B), which have been acknowledged by 
C. Such requests are suspicious since, in normal circumstances, 
TTP should not be asking for a recovery of a request that has 
been acknowledged by C (i.e., a request from A or B for which 
C has sent an NRR). 
This anomalous behaviour from TTP may be due to different 
reasons. To issue a recovery request, TTP should know the 
details of the original data uploading (downloading) request 
from A (B). There are four different ways in which TTP can 
obtain this knowledge: (i) A or B might have sent the original 
request to TTP and ask it to initiate the recovery phase, (ii) an 
attacker, who has managed to obtain the details of the original 
request of A and B and impersonate them, sends it to TTP, or 
(iii) TTP has itself acted as an attacker (as in (ii)), obtained the 
details of the original request from A or B and sent the 
recovery request to C.  
Case (i) itself may be the result of a malicious attempt to 
initiate the recovery phase by A or B. The reason for this could 
be, for example, to test via TTP how C and TTP would react to 
such non normal requests and whether it would be possible to 
launch some DoS attack onto C (via TTP) or onto TTP itself. 
However, (i) can also be the result of A or B being timed out 
due to a (non malicious) delay in the arrival of the NRRA(B) 
sent to them by C caused by the network connection between 
A(B) and C. 
To monitor requests for recovery from TTP corresponding 
to already responded requests for data uploading from A, the 
NR certification model uses the following monitoring 
assumption: 
ANOMALY ASSUMPTIONS  
TTP.A1: 
Happens(e(_id1,  _TTP,  _C,  RQSTC,  _C),  _tTReq,  [_tTReq, 
_tTReq]) ∧ HoldsAt(ResUpReq(RQSAC,_X,_t), _tTReq) ⇒ 
Initiates(e(_id1, _TTP, _C, RQSTC, _C),  
SuspTTPReq(_TTP, RQSTC, _tTReq), _tTReq)  
WHERE 
RQSTC  =  {_fRQS
TC
,  _l,  _A,  _C,  _TTP,  _Seq5,  _tg5,  _t3, 
_EC(SA(H(M),H(BL),_EGB(K,l,SA(H(M))),H(l,Seq1,tg1,t1))),EC(
ST(H(l,A,C,TTP,Seq5,tg5,t5,EC(ST(H(M),H(BL),_EGB(K,l,SA(H(M
))),H(l,Seq1,tg1,t1))))))} 
RQSAC = {_fRQS
AC
, _l, _A, _C, _TTP, _H(M), _H(BL), _Seq1, 
_tg1, _t1, _EGB(K, l, SA(H(M))), _EC(SA(H(M), H(BL), 
_EGB(K, l, SA(H(M))), H(l, Seq1, tg1,t1)))}  
 
3) (Anomalous) Operating conditions 
An example of an operating condition that should be 
monitored by the NR certification model is the average time 
that it takes for a response from C to reach its intended 
recipient party (i.e., A, B or TTP). Monitoring this time is 
important as it might indicate that responses to A, B or TTP 
reach them with delays that can get them timed out, despite C 
having issued these responses within the time period required 
by the NR protocol (i.e., within the period [_tAReq,_tAReq+f(_t1)] 
required by rule R1 in the case of NRRs from C to A). Such 
delays might be due to network delays or some man-in-the-
middle attack on the communication C and A, B and TTP. 
Monitoring the exact average time of the arrival of a NRR 
from C to A, B or TTP is not possible as in general the 
monitoring framework of the certification authority that 
realises the NR certification model does not have access to 
events occurring at A and B. An approximate estimate of this 
average time is, however, possible by monitoring the average 
time of network traffic in the opposite direction, i.e., the 
average time that it takes for RQSAC, RQSBC and RQSTC to 
reach C after being dispatched by A, B or TTP. 
The following anomaly monitoring assumptions show how 
the NR certification model monitors the network delay for 
traffic from A to C: 
ANOMALY ASSUMPTIONS  
A.A3: Initially(avgAC(_A,_C, 0,0), systime()) 
A.A4: Happens(e(_id1,_A,_C, RQSAC,_C),_tAReq,[_tAReq, _tAReq]) 
∧ HoldsAt(avgAC(_A,_C, _avg,_N), _tAReq) ⇒ 
Terminates(e(_id1,_A,_C, RQSAC,_C), avgAC(_A,_C, 
_avg,_N),_tAReq) ∧ 
Initiates(e(_id1,_A,_C, RQSAC,_C), avgAC(_A,_C,(_avg*_N 
+ (_tAReq –_tg1))/(_N+1),(_N+1)), _tAReq) 
The anomaly assumption A.A3 initiates the fluent 
avgAC(_A,_C, _avg,_N) that is used to keep a record of the 
average time that it takes for data upload requests RQSAC to 
reach C from A; _avg is the variable keeping the average value 
and _N is the variable keeping the number of requests that 
have been taken into account for calculating this average. The 
second formula updates this fluent by re-calculating the values 
of _avg to take into account the travelling time of the last 
RQSAC , i.e., _tAReq – _tg1 (_tg1 is recorded in RQSAC as shown 
in the specification of rule R1). In this case, the certification 
model should raise a warning to the certification authority in 
cases where _avg > f(t1), as this would lead to A being 
systematically timed out due to delays in the network traffic 
between A and C. This warning is also shown in the NR 
certificate life cycle model in Sect. IV.3. The NR certification 
model includes also anomaly-monitoring assumptions similar 
to Anomaly.A.A3 and Anomaly.A.A4 for Bs and TTPs.  
C. Life Cycle model 
The life-cycle model of the NR certification model is shown 
in Figure 4. According to this model, the first state in the 
certificate’s lifecycle is called “Activated”, where the 
certification process i activated. After being activated, the 
certificate process moves to the state Continuous Monitoring.  
Whilst being in this state, the security property and anomaly 
detection monitoring rules and assumptions of the model are 
being monitored (by the monitor of the CUMULUS platform) 
and the related monitoring evidence is sent to the framework 
(see transition evidence(e:MonResult)). When the accumulated 
evidence meets the sufficient conditions of the model and the 
security property monitoring rules are satisfied, the process 
moves to the state Pre-Issued (see transition when(sec-
assertion-satisfied AND sufficiency-conditions-satisfied) from 
D1 to Pre-Issued). At this state, the framework will check if 
the extra validity conditions for the certificate type (see action 
CheckValidityConditions) and, if they are satisfied, the process 
will move to the state Issued, at which a concrete certificate for 
NR of the specific provider is generated internally by the 
platform and can be obtained by an interested external party 
upon request (see transition retrieveCertificate). 
 
Figure 4.  Monitoring-based CM: UML diagram of Life Cycle Model 
Whilst in Issuing state, if an anomaly is detected, the 
certification process will move to the state Anomaly-Audit, (see 
transition when(unresolved-anomalies)) where all the detected 
anomalies must be selected (see state AnomalySelection) and 
inspected (see state AnomalyInspection) one by one. This is the 
responsibility of the certification authority that will sign off the 
certificates. If all the detected anomalies can be resolved, the 
process moves back to History state, i.e., the state where it was 
prior to moving to Anomaly-Audit. Otherwise, if there are 
anomalies that cannot be resolved (i.e., accepted as affordable 
risks), the process moves to the state Revoke, where any 
certificates issued for the particular TOC will be revoked and 
no further certificates will be issued. 
When the expiration date of an issued certificate is reached, 
as stated in the ExpirationCondition of MBCM, the 
certification process will move to state D1 (see the transition 
when (expiration-conditions)). At this point if a sufficient body 
evidence has already been accumulated for issuing a new 
instance of the certificate, the process will move automatically 
to the state Issuing or otherwise it will continue gathering 
evidence until a new certificate instance can be issued.  
VI. CUMULUS FRAMEWORK 
MBCMs are enacted by the CUMULUS framework to 
produce and manage certificates. The CUMULUS framework 
consists of a certification communicator (CC), a certificate 
generator (CG), a monitoring manager (MM), and a 
certification models (MBCM), an evidence (EDB) and a 
certificate database (CeDB). It also interacts with external 
monitors (MON), as shown in Figure 5. 
The monitoring manager (MM) is responsible for creating 
and modifying MBCMs according to the actors’ requirements, 
and for managing the monitoring process for certifying a 
specific security property. Moreover, MM provides the 
monitoring configuration of an MBCM to MON, and polls the 
monitor at regular intervals in order to collect monitoring 
results. Once retrieved, these results are stored in EDB. The 
certification communicator (CC) allows external actors to 
retrieve generated (issued) certificates. CC retrieves such 
certificates from the CeDB. The certificate generator (CG) has 
responsibility for enacting MBCMs in order to generate and 
manage certificates. CG acts as an executor of the life cycle 
model of MBCM. During this execution it also access and 
updates information in EDB. When a certificate is generated, it 
is stored in the CeDB.  
 
Figure 5.  CUMULUS Framework 
The monitor (MON) is responsible for monitoring the 
security property and anomaly assertions specified in MBCM. 
To do so, it is given these assertions by the framework and 
checks them against cloud event streams that are generated by 
event captors (EC) placed on cloud infrastructures. The 
communication between EC and MON is based on an event 
bus, which is implemented as a pub/sub infrastructure.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have introduced a certification model 
(CM) for the NR protocol of cloud services that is based on 
continuous monitoring. The CM defines the conditions that 
should be monitored at runtime in order to confirm that a cloud 
provider adheres to the protocol and therefore offers the NR 
property. Furthermore, it defines conditions regarding the 
sufficiency of monitoring evidence for issuing certificates, 
anomalies that should be monitored during the certification, 
and the overall life cycle model (process) for generating NR 
certificates. Our model has been implemented using the 
CUMULUS certification framework. 
Currently, we are conducting an evaluation of the 
performance of this model and investigate how to deploy 
model checking techniques in order to statically verify certain 
properties of it (e.g., soundness) and more generally of 
certification models following the CUMULUS approach, prior 
to putting them in operation. This work is exploring the use of 
model checking techniques for this purpose. 
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